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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Nathan Banbury was convicted of grand theft following a jury trial.

However,

during trial a police officer testified that Mr. Banbury had invoked his right to remain
silent, following the provision of Miranda 1 warnings, when police attempted to question
his about the theft allegation. Although this improper testimony was not objected to at
trial, Mr. Banbury asserts that this instance of prosecutorial misconduct rose to the level
of a fundamental error that was not harmless in this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Nathan Banbury was charged by Information with grand theft based upon the
allegation that he stole a car.

(R., pp.23-24.)

However, prior to the filing of this

Information, the court ordered a competency evaluation for Mr. Banbury pursuant to
I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212 upon the request of Mr. Banbury's trial counsel. (8/12/09
Tr. 2 , p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.8; R., pp.12-14.)

Mr. Banbury was ultimately found to be

competent to stand triaL (10/15/09 Tr., p.5, L.11 - p.6, L.2; 18-211 evaluation dated
9/25/09.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to present other-acts evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). (R., p.33.) The State was seeking to present the testimony of
a police detective, "regarding his prior investigation and subsequent conviction of
Nathan Todd Banbury for Grand Theft."

(R., p.33.)

The proposed basis for the

admissibility of this evidence was to prove intent, common scheme or plan, or the

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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absence of mistake or accident. (R., p.33.) The district court denied the State's motion
to present this evidence without prejudice, finding that the State had not presented
sufficient facts that would demonstrate the admissibility of this evidence under the
purposes proffered by the State and in light of the remoteness in time of the alleged
prior bad acts. (1/19/10 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.1.) However, the district court did note
that it might revisit its ruling depending upon what evidence was presented at trial.
(1/19/10 Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.8, L.1.)
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Carter Palmer, the owner of the car
dealership from which Mr. Banbury was alleged to have stolen a car.

(1/26/10

Tr., p.116, L.17 - p.117, L.20.) Mr. Palmer testified that Mr. Banbury was looking at a
white Cadillac on the car lot and asked for the keys in order to take a look inside the car.
(1/26/10 Tr., p.117, Ls.13-25.) When Mr. Banbury allegedly asked to drive the car, the
dealer told him that he could not because the car was being held for another customer.
(1/26/10Tr., p.118, Ls.11-21.)
Mr. Palmer testified that he recognized Mr. Banbury because he had been on the
car lot two or three times before. (1/26/t0 Tr,; p.119, Ls.15~22,)

Each prior time he

came in, he had asked about the same white Cadillac. (1/26/10 Tr., p.119, Ls.15-22.)
Mr. Palmer also testified that the price listed on this car was $10,500.

(1/26/10

Tr., p.119, Ls.23-25.)
According to Mr. Palmer's testimony, he left Mr. Banbury alone on the car lot with
the keys to the Cadillac and returned inside to his office.

(1/26/10 Tr., p.120, L.23 -

p.121, L.23.) After a while, Mr. Palmer looked outside the window of his office to the car
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Because there are multiple copies of transcripts on appeal in Mr. Banbury's case, for
ease of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts of proceedings are made in
accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed.
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lot and noticed that the white Cadillac was gone. (1/26/10 Tr., p.122, Ls.4-8.) When he
went outside and looked down the street, he saw the car at a nearby stoplight. (1/26/10
Tr., p.122, Ls.9-18.) Mr. Palmer then went inside his office and called the police who
arrived at his car lot within minutes. (1/26/10 Tr., p.122, Ls.17-21.)
Mr. Palmer then gave police a description of the car, along with pictures and the
car's vehicle identification number. (1/26/10 Tr., p.122, L.22 - p.123, L.5.) He also,
according to his testimony, called several of his friends and asked them to be on the
lookout for the car. (1/26/10 Tr., p.123, Ls.9-21.) One of these friends called him later
that day and told Mr. Palmer that he thought he had seen the car. (1/26/10 Tr., p.123,
L.22 - p.124, L.7.) Mr. Palmer then went to the location of where his friend thought he
saw the car to verify it was the one taken from his lot. (1/26/10 Tr., p.124, Ls.1-7.)
The car, according to Mr. Palmer's testimony, had a front advertising license
plate that reflected the name of his car dealership and there was likewise a sticker from
the dealership on the trunk of the car. (1/26/10 Tr., p.124, Ls.8-19.) In addition, there
was pre-existing damage to a bumper that was present on the Cadillac when it was first
acquired by the dealership;- and Mr. Palmer testified that he saw that same damage to.

the car that Mr. Palmer was told might be his. (1/26/1 O Tr., p.124, L.20 - p.125, L.10.)
At that point, Mr. Palmer called the police, who then came to the residence where the
car was located. (1/26/10 Tr., p.125, Ls.11-14.)
Following Mr. Palmer's testimony, the State called Officer Stephen Simper of the
Blackfoot Police Department to the stand to testify. (1/26/10 Tr., p.128, L.15 - p.129,
L.4.)

Officer Simper was the officer who first responded to the report of a theft at

Mr. Palmer's car lot. (1/26/10 Tr., p.129, Ls.11-21.) He met with Mr. Palmer, who told
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Officer Simper about the car alleged to have been stolen and described the man who
took it (1/26/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.1-16.)
Later that same day, when the car was located, Officer Simper went to the home
where the car was found and identified the car as the one Mr. Palmer had reported as
stolen. (1/26/10 Tr., p.130, L.24 - p.132, L.15.) The officer thereafter did a "security
check" inside of the home.

(1/26/1 O Tr., p.133, Ls.14-16.)

He noticed clothing

consistent with that described by Mr. Palmer as that worn by the man who took the car.
(1/26/10 Tr., p.133, L.24 - p.134, L.21.) In the living room, near where Mr. Banbury was
sitting, Officer Simper noticed a car dealership placard and cut up warranty slip in the
garbage can. (1/26/10Tr., p.134, L.22-p.135, L.16.)
The State's final witness was Lieutenant Scott Gay. (1/26/10 Tr., p.142, L.18 p.143, L.5.) Lieutenant Gay was among the officers who responded to Mr. Banbury's
residence upon the white Cadillac being found there. (1/26/10 Tr., p.143, L.22 - p.144,
L.4.)

He identified Mr. Banbury as the person who lived at this home.

(1/26/10

Tr., p.144, Ls.5-13.)
The prosecutor also asked the officer about whether he had talked to
Mr. Banbury regarding the alleged theft.

(1/26/10 Tr., p.145, Ls.14-18.)

During the

State's examination of Lieutenant Gay, the officer made two statements directly
commenting on Mr. Banbury's invocation of his right to remain silent.

(1/26/10

Tr., p.147, Ls.1-9.) Specifically, the officer testified:
Q:

And after you recovered the key, what happened at that time?

A:

Got the keys. I asked him some questions about whether or
not he had taken the car. He said he wanted to remain silent.
And I asked him also if his fingerprints would be located inside the
car. He said probably.
4

I asked him if he washed the car. He said he wanted to remain
silent on several of the questions.
(1/26/10 Tr., p.147, Ls.1-9.)
Mr. Banbury did not object to the officer's comments on his invocation of his right
to remain silent. (1/26/10 Tr., p.147, Ls.1-14.)
Mr. Banbury was convicted of grand theft.

(1/26/10 Tr., p.192, Ls.11-21;

R., pp.108-109, 116.) Mr. Banbury was conditionally accepted into mental health court.

(R., p.124.) However, this conditional acceptance was ultimately rescinded due to an
incident that occurred while Mr. Banbury was incarcerated at the Bingham County Jail.
(R., pp.126, 139.) Ultimately, Mr. Banbury was sentenced to eight years, with one year

fixed, for his conviction of grand theft. (8/19/10 Tr., p.27, L.22 - p.28, L.4; R., pp.147148.)

Mr. Banbury timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.

(R., p.149.)

5

ISSUE
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when a
police officer testified at trial regarding Mr. Banbury's invocation of his right to remain
silent for the purpose of inferring guilt?
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
When A Police Officer Testified At Trial Regarding Mr. Banbury's Invocation Of His
Right To Remain Silent For The Purpose Of Inferring Guilt

A.

Introduction
Mr. Banbury asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level

of a fundamental error, when a police officer made several statements at Mr. Banbury's
trial regarding his invocation of his right to remain silent while being questioned by
police. This testimony was non-responsive to the question asked, was irrelevant to the
proper issues at trial, and was only provided for the purpose of having the jury infer
Mr. Banbury's guilt. Moreover, this error was not harmless in light of the dispute at trial
regarding whether Mr. Banbury harbored the required criminal intent to support the
State's charge of grand theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct that was not

objected to at trial under the fundamental error test -as set forth by the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). This review is comprised of a three-part
inquiry, for which the defendant bears the burden of proof.

Id. at 228.

First, the

defendant must establish that the alleged error involved a violation of one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights. Id. Second, the error must be shown to be
plain 'from the record, without the need of additional information not contained within the
appellate record. Id. Finally, the defendant must show that the error was not harmless.

Id.

An error is not harmless where there is a reasonable possibility that the error

affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226.
7

For purposes of analyzing prosecutorial misconduct, where a police officer
testifies at trial in a manner that violates a defendant's right to a fair trial, the officer's
response is imputed to the State for purposes of a misconduct claim. State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011).

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, When A Police Officer Testified At Trial Regarding Mr. Banbury's
Invocation Of His Right To Remain Silent For The Purpose Of Inferring Guilt
Mr. Banbury asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the

United State's Constitution, as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were
violated when the prosecutor elicited evidence that he exercised his right to remain
silent for purposes of having the jury infer his guilt, and that this misconduct rose to the
level of a fundamental error. Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United State's Constitution, as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no person
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.
At trial, the prosecutor first asked Lieutenant Gay whether Mr. Banbury was
advised of his right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 3 (1/26/10 Tr. p.145,
Ls.14-18.) After eliciting testimony that he had been so advised, the following exchange
took place:
Q:

And after you recovered the key, what happened at that time?

A:

Got the keys. I asked him some questions about whether or
not he had taken the car. He said he wanted to remain silent.
And I asked him also if his fingerprints would be located inside the
car. He said probably.
I asked him if he washed the car. He said he wanted to remain
silent on several of the questions.

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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(1/26/10 Tr., p.147, Ls.1-9.)
The United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
"that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In Doyle, the actions of the prosecutor in cross-examining the defendants
as to the reason they had not given their version of events at the time of their arrests
were actions that violated the defendants' rights. Id. at 613-614 n.5.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[i]f a prosecutor is allowed to introduce
evidence of silence, for any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), becomes so
diluted as to be rendered worthless." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 714-715 (1976).
The Court went on to find, "[i]t is clearly erroneous to allow evidence of post-arrest
silence at trial for the purpose of raising an inference of guilt."

Id. at 715 (citation

omitted).
Similar holdings have been reiterated in multiple cases addressing the comment
on the defendant's invocation of his or her right to remain silent in the context of
fundamental error.

See, e.g., State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2005);

State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577-578 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho
296, 298-299 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1989).
For purposes of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Lieutenant Gay's improper
testimony about Mr. Banbury's invocation of his right to remain silent is imputed to the
prosecutor, regardless of whether these remarks were responsive to the prosecutor's
questions.

Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67.

This testimony, provided for the purpose of

having the jury infer Mr. Banbury's guilt, was a clear violation of Mr. Banbury's
9

constitutional right to remain silent, and due process right to a fair trial that is plain from
the record.
Moreover, this error was not harmless. The sole issue that was meaningfully in
dispute in this case was whether Mr. Banbury had the requisite intent to support the
State's allegation of grand theft.

(1/26/10 Tr., p.183, Ls.7-14.)

Toward this end,

Mr. Banbury cross-examined the police officers in this case about Mr. Banbury's
apparent failure to take rational steps to conceal the vehicle alleged to have been
stolen. (1/26/10 Tr., p.141, Ls.10-21, p.147, L.18 - p.148, L.2.) He also tailored his
closing statement to doubts raised about whether he harbored the intent required in
order to sustain the grand theft charge.

(1/26/10 Tr., p.183, Ls.7-14.)

The State's

impermissible implication of Mr. Banbury's guilt through his failure to cooperate with
police was "an indirect attack on this defense." See, e.g., Poland, 116 Idaho at 37.
Accordingly, because there was a meaningful question about Mr. Banbury's mental
state regarding the vehicle alleged to have been stolen, and because the State's
testimony sought to induce the jury to infer guilt from Mr. Banbury's failure to answer
police questions, there is a reasonable possibility that this testimony contributed to the
jury's verdict in this case.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Banbury asks that this Court vacate his conviction for grand theft and remand
this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of March, 1~012.

\
RAH E. TOMPKINS
puty State Appellate Public Defender
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